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Two preconditions are required in order to produce 
a  strategy:  to  know  others,  or  the  strategic 
environment  –  sources  of  threats,  alliances  and 
friendships – and to know thyself, or the strategic 
identity.  French  strategic  thinker  Lucien  Poirier 
qualified this second dimension as an ontological one 
that is all the more insightful within the context of 
White Book production at the national level.1  
This  contribution  aims  at  defining  both 
preconditions as they pertain to the EU, and at 
articulating a strategy that relies upon them. It is 
divided  into  three  parts,  first  of  which  is  the 
description  of  the  current  international  system. 
Using  a  “sociological  toolbox”,  I  will  qualify  the 
strategic environment of the EU as unstable due to 
several factors. The second section deals with the 
EU‟s  strategic  identity,  not  a  strategic  actor  but 
rather  a  strategic  third-party.  The  last  section 
proposes a strategy that will connect environment 
and  identity;  I  will  tackle  the  idea  of  “Grand 
Strategy”, and more specifically, I will explain why 
another expression is needed. 
                                                            
1 Lucien Poirier, La crise des fondements, Paris, Economica, 1994, p. 
179. 
In Egmont Paper No. 33 “The Value of 
Power, the Power of Values: A Call for 
an EU Grand Strategy”, edited by Sven 
Biscop, Egmont calls for an EU Grand 
Strategy  completing  the  European 
Security  Strategy  by  identifying  EU 
interests  and  setting  concrete 
objectives. A proactive EU, acting as a 
true global power, must result. Some of 
Europe’s  leading  strategic  thinkers 
react to Egmont’s proposals in its series 
of Security Policy Briefs.  
In this first paper of the Grand Strategy 
Project  series,  French  expert  Frédéric 
Ramel  describes  the  EU  as  being  a 
third party more than a strategic actor. 
In  a  world  that  is  unstable  due  to  its 
oligopolar  structure  and  its 
heterogeneous  nature,  he  argues,  the 
EU  needs  a  “complete  strategy”  in 
order to (1) reconcile maximum variety 
and diversity with maximum unity and 
integration; (2) set up coordination with 
other  actors;  and  (3)  develop  strategic 
agility and strategic expectancy.  
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The International System Today: A Source 
of Instability 
The  international  system  is  formed  by  political 
institutions that have regular interactions, including 
war.  In  order  to  precisely  define  the  current 
international system, two dimensions may be used: 
structure and nature. 
Structure: uncompleted oligo-polarity. What configuration 
of  poles  based  on  material  components  –  the 
number of global powers – is emerging today? The 
“unipolar  moment”  has  disappeared  because  of 
both economic weaknesses (the financial crisis) and 
military  choices  against  “rogue  States”.  However, 
neither does the current system fit the model of a 
multi-polar order (more than 20 powers). In reality, 
the current system most closely resembles an oligo-
polar structure (between 5 and 7 powers)2. In such a 
configuration, no one can win against the coalition 
of all others. Contrary to fully-fledged multipolarity, 
all actors are required to adopt defensive strategies 
in order to maintain the status quo, and they share a 
common purpose: reinforcing cooperation between 
themselves.3  
Who are these actors? They include the US, China, 
India,  Russia  and  Brazil.  We  must  add  three 
remarks: 
-  The emerging powers that comprise this oligo-
polar structure tend to reproduce a hierarchical 
conception  of  international  order.  They  are 
reluctant  to  democratize  the  international 
system  entirely.  Their  aim  is  to  legitimize  a 
world “directorate”.4  
                                                            
2  This  distinction  explains  my  dissension  with  the  notion  of 
inter-polarity,  which  means  “multi-polarity  in  the  age  of 
interdependence”  as  developed  by  Giovanni  Grevi  (see  “The 
Interpolar World: A New Scenario”, Occasional Paper 79, Paris, 
EU Institute for Security Studies, June 2009, p. 9). Additionally, 
general mechanisms of inter-polarity (Cooperation and Conflict) 
are not new in the international system but rather factors that 
shape international debates (economy, energy, environment). 
3  For  this  notion  of  oligo-polarity,  see  Jean  Baechler,  “La 
mondialisation  politique”, in  Jean  Baechler,  Ramine  Kamrane, 
dir., Aspects de la mondialisation politique, Report from the Académie 
des  Sciences  morales  et  politiques,  pp.  6-10. 
http://www.asmp.fr/travaux/gpw/mondialisation/Baechler1.pd
f    
4 Sebastian Santander, “Vers une d￩centralisation progressive du 
monde en une multiplicit￩ de pôles”, in Sebastian Santander, ed., 
L‟￩mergence  de  nouvelles  puissances.  Vers  un  système 
multipolaire?, Paris, Ellipses, 2009, p. 235. 
-  Russia and Brazil are “the least emergent among 
the emerging powers”5 because of the former‟s 
demographic and societal vulnerabilities, and the 
latter‟s  uncertainty  about  the  actualization  of 
power. 
-  The  EU  can  become  a  global  power  through 
increased  political  integration,  but  such  a 
process  causes  a  double  problem:  it  may 
provoke  public  suspicion  and  resistance,  as 
opinion polls reveal, but also cleavages between 
Member States (not all of them are willing to 
increase integration). 
 
Finally, the process of oligo-polarity is incomplete 
and further complicated by transnational actors that 
insert asymmetrical links in the system.  
Nature: heterogeneous world. This second dimension of 
analysis  refers  to  the  assimilation  of  political 
regimes, principles and values that participants in a 
system  share.  Raymond  Aron  argues:  “I  call 
homogeneous  systems  those  in  which  the  States 
belong to the same type, obey the same conception 
of policy. I call heterogeneous, on the other hand, 
those  systems  in  which  the  States  are  organized 
according  to  different  principles  and  appeal  to 
contradictory  values”.  Composed  of  States  that 
share  the  same  values  and  political  regimes, 
homogeneous  systems  are  more  stable  than 
heterogeneous ones. In the latter, wars are frequent 
because  of  ideological  struggles.  Based  on  this 
distinction,  the  use  of  force  by  States  in  a 
homogeneous  society  can  be  explained  by  two 
elements:  to  identify  a  threatening  heterogeneous 
State  (or  rebel  actor)  and/or  to  socialize  this 
heterogeneous  State  (or  actor)  by  force.  Thus, 
homogenization of the international society aims at 
producing  global  inclusion.  In  other  words,  this 
process depends on a kind of global universalism. 
Today,  the  international  system  remains 
heterogeneous,  even  though  one  can  identify 
convergences.  Lines  are  not  only  spatial  but  also 
“substantive” (values-based), as they express what 
States believe the international order should be. 
Thus, the international system is unstable because 
of the asymmetry between current actors (nation-
states vs. non-state actors, etc.), its heterogeneous 
                                                            
5 Thomas Renard, “A BRIC in the World: Emerging Powers, 
Europe,  and  the  Coming  Order”,  Egmont  Papers,  31,  October 
2009, p. 3.  
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Non-partisan and mediator  “produces  concordance  between  two  colliding  parties  by  creating  direct  contact 
between the unconnected or quarrelling elements; functions as an arbiter who balances 
the contradictory claims against one another and eliminates what is incompatible in 
them” 
Divide et impera  “third  element  intentionally  produces  the  conflict  in  order  to  gain  a  dominating 
position” 
Tertius gaudens  “uses his relatively superior position for purely egoistic interests (interactions take place 
between other parties and  himself and they become a means for his own purposes)” 
 
nature, and the non-achievement of oligo-polarity.6 
What is the EU‟s role in such an environment?  
EU  Identity:  A  Third-party  in  the 
International System 
Even if the EU increases its capacity and assumes a 
stronger strategic position, it will not be a strategic 
actor from a military or classical point of view, but 
rather it will be a third-party.7  
How is the EU a third? First, the EU maintains an 
exterior  position  towards  parties  in  conflict. 
Secondly, if it does intervene, it is in response to 
requests from parties in conflict or the UN Security 
Council (as the different mandates adopted by the 
European Council reveal). Thirdly, the EU is not a 
military alliance like NATO. But what kind of third 
does it embody? A typology of the third provided 
by  Georg  Simmel  in  his  Sociology  (1908)8 
distinguishes three kinds of third -parties (see  box 
below).  
                                                            
6 Dario Battistella, Théories des relations internationales, Paris, Presses 
de Sciences Po, 2009, 3rd ed., pp. 642-643. 
7 To a certain extent, I agree with Charlotte Wagnsson (“The EU 
as  a  Strategic  Actor,  „Re-Actor‟  or  Passive  Pole?”,  in  Kjell 
Engelbrekt, Jan Hallenberg The European Union and Strategy: 
An Emerging Actor, London, Routledge, 2009, pp. 193-199 ) 
who  distinguishes  the  EU  from  strategic  actors  in  a  classical 
sense, but the other concepts she uses must be enlarged (pole 
and re-actor) by integrating the notion of a third-party. I agree, 
too,  with  Adrian  Hyde-Price  (  “A  Neurotic  Centaur:  The 
Limitations of the EU as a Strategic Actor” , in Kjell Engelbrekt, 
Jan Hallenberg, op .cit., p. 165.) about his general diagnosis (the 
EU is not a strategic actor) but not with his supporting factors 
(national foreign policy interests automatically become coherent 
at a supranational level according to the Machiavellian concept 
of the “Centaur”.). Regarding political objectives, the EU aims at 
developing the functions of a third-party.  
8 Trans. Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe, Illinois, Free press, 1950, pp. 
145-179. 
The Union does not embody an actor that benefits 
from the conflict (tertius gaudens) or aims at creating 
a conflict between foreign actors (divide et impera). Its 
role  is  most  closely  identified  with  Simmel's  first 
category, but it is not a judicial power. If the EU 
has assumed the function of mediator, it fails to be 
an  arbitrator  or  judge  in  the  general  conception. 
Rather, the EU is a “tiers structurant” or structuring 
third:9  a  new  category  outside  Simmel‟s  original 
theory.  The  purpose  of  this  kind  of  third  is  to 
support the local population, in all its diversity, to 
structure its society in compliance with the principle 
of local ownership, taking into account relative time 
factors, and as much as possible according to EU 
norms and values.  
This implies an art or practice of “weaving” links 
between people from an economic, political, social 
and  now  security  point  of  view.  Several  missions 
illustrate  such  practice,  including  the  Aceh 
Monitoring Mission in Indonesia, EUBAM Rafah, 
and EUMM Georgia.10 The EU is already a major 
institution that is not being bypassed, but rather it is 
seen as a source of stabilization abroad. The EU 
must have a strategy based on this i dentity as a 
third-party. What concrete objectives and priorities 
should it develop as a strategic third?  
                                                            
9 A collective study produced by an IRSEM workshop will be 
published on this concept: “L‟UE en tant que tiers strat￩gique”, 
Cahiers de l’IRSEM, winter 2010, forthcoming. 
10 See Gilles Mahric, “Une approche institutionnelle du tiers dans 
les  crises:  l‟Union  europ￩enne  comme  tiers  structurant”  in 
“L‟UE  en  tant  que  tiers  strat￩gique”,  Cahier  de  l’IRSEM, 
forthcoming.   
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A “Complete Strategy” for a Third-party 
“Grand Strategy” is not the best way to devise a 
strategy for the EU as a “tiers structurant”. What 
concept may be more adequate and why?  
The  limits  of  “Grand  Strategy”.  Applying  “Grand 
Strategy” to the EU encounters several obstacles. 
First,  it  implies  the  use  of  a  state's  perspective 
(state-centric  approach).  When  Liddell  Hart11  and 
Paul Kennedy provided their conception of “Grand 
Strategy”, they were thinking about a strategy for 
the Nation-State.12 But the EU is not a State, nor a 
military alliance.  
Secondly,  “Grand  Strategy”  was  developed  as  an 
American  model,  and  is  a  notion  carried  on  by 
several experts in the United States even post-Cold 
War.13  Offensively and defensively reinforced by 
flexible coalitions,14 it intends to maintain American 
leadership  in  the  international  system.  Some 
analysts argue that a strong link may be identified 
between this Grand Strategy and a will to  extend 
the weakening unipolar moment. 15  The EU must 
not fall into this trap, which could be viewed as a 
kind of Polybius syndrome (the idea of copying the 
strategy of the dominant power). Last but not least, 
using a Grand Strategy means being influenced by a 
Machiavellian trend. When Americans propose a 
“Grand Strategy” that will shape the international 
environment  for  American  security  interests,  they 
refer implicitly to a Machiavellian philosophy. In his 
Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli argues that republics 
should follow the example of the Roman Empire 
by adopting an imperialist and expansionist foreign 
                                                            
11 B.H. Liddel Hart, Strategy, New York: Meridian, 1991, p. 332. 
12 Grand strategy aims at using “diplomacy to improve a state‟s 
ability to leverage its reputation and access to assistance”. Paul 
Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Towards a Broader 
Definition”,  in  Paul Kennedy,  ed.,  Grand  Strategies  in  War  and 
Peace, New Haven: University Press, 1991, p. 4-5. 
13 Francis Fukuyama and John Ikenberry, Report on Grand Strategy, 
Working Group on Preventive Action, 2006, Woodrow Wilson 
School, Princeton  
(http://wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/fall/GS
C.pdf). See also Barry Posen. 
14 David C. Ellis, “US Grand Strategy Following the George W. 
Bush  Presidency”,  International Studies  Perspectives,  10,  2009,  pp. 
361-377. 
15 Jonathan Merten, “Primacy and Grand Strategy Beliefs in US 
Unilateralism”, Global Governance, 13, 2007, pp. 119-138. 
policy.  He  advises  building  a  “Republic  of 
Expansion”, as he observes the need for continual 
expansion if a Republic is to achieve greatness and 
glory.  No  expansion  results  in  decline  either 
through  stagnation  and  dissolution  over  time,  or 
being conquered by others, as the experiences of 
Venice  and  Sparta  reveal.  These  Republics  were 
conquered whereas Rome used its virtù: a capacity 
to anticipate the risks caused by its political growth 
and  a  willingness  to  correct  resultant  disorders. 
States in the post-Cold War world do not follow the 
expansionist  policies  of the Romans for fear that 
such practices would be like the myth of the sword 
of Damocles – the leader living in constant fear that 
one day he will be toppled. 
Finally,  the  EU  is  not  a  power  like  others.  The 
Laeken  Declaration  insists  on  making  this 
distinction: “the role [the EU] has to play is that of 
a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, 
all  terror  and  all  fanaticism”.  We  must  avoid  the 
trap  of  strategic  sameness  that  Kenneth  Waltz 
formulates about all strategic actors: “competition 
produces  a  tendency  toward  the  sameness  of  the 
competitors”.16  That  is  why  the  notion  of 
“Complete  Strategy”  (Lucien  Poirier)  is  more 
adapted for the EU.  
A “Complete Strategy” for the EU. This strategy differs 
from  “Grand  Strategy”  because  the  political 
objectives are quite different.17 Even though they 
have the use of resources in common, the aims are 
not the same. A Complete Strategy applied to the 
EU must be built upon three considerations.  
To  reconcile  maximum  variety  and  diversity 
with maximum unity and integration. This first 
step boils down to integrating general strategies – 
diplomacy,  economics,  security  and  military  –  in 
order  to  go  beyond  the  image  of  a  “composite 
actor”.  From  an  institutional  point  of  view,  the 
Lisbon  Treaty  revitalises  this  process  thanks  to 
several  innovations:  a  High  Representative  of 
                                                            
16 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, p . 127. 
17 Lars Wedin (“The EU as a Military Strategic Actor”,  in Kjell 
Engelbrekt,  Jan  Hallenberg,  op.  Cit,  p.  43  and  pp.  46-47)  is 
correct to apply Lucien Poirier‟s thought to the EU, but I am 
reluctant to translate “strat￩gie int￩grale” into “Grand Strategy” 
because of the arguments above.   
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Union  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy,  a 
European External Action Service (EEAS), and a 
permanent  President  of  the  Council.  From  an 
operational point of view, the EU has already been 
practicing this integrative approach since 2003 by 
broadening the second pillar through the successful 
development  of  civil-military  missions.18  From  a 
material point of view, the EU has a strategy of 
resource  management  that  is  both  logistical 
(“making  available  and  placing  resources  at  the 
disposal of military and civil forces”) and generative 
(“creation of new resources through research and 
industrial development”).19  
To set up coordination with other actors. In the 
spirit  of  the  San  Francisco  Charter,  the  EU  has 
developed  task-sharing  with  other  organizations 
(even  sub-regional  actors,  especially  in  Africa). 
However,  major  decisions  regarding  coordination 
have always revolved around NATO because “the 
evolution  of  transatlantic  relations  is  the  primary 
determinant  for  the  future  of  Europe  as  an 
international actor”.20 The birth of ESDP in 1999 
caused  a  stir  in  Washington,  and  the  Clinton 
administration was reluctant to its development, as 
evidenced by the 3 “D” doctrine: no Decoupling, 
no Discrimination and no Duplication. Madeleine 
Albright professed a NATO First attitude because 
she feared a weaker financial participation from the 
Europeans in the Atlantic Alliance. Ten years later, 
this fear has dissipated. The Obama administration 
is friendly and open to the development of (now) 
CSDP. As National Security Advisor, General Jones 
argues: “There is much less division between being 
European  and  being  a  member  of  the  Atlantic 
Community.  A  Europe  that  is  strong  and 
                                                            
18  See  Henri  Bent￩geat  “Declaration”,  September  2009, 
Assembly of WEU : 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090916%
20WEU.pdf  
19 Lars Wedin, “The EU as a Military Strategic Actor”,  in Kjell 
Engelbrekt, Jan Hallenberg, op. Cit, p. 49. 
20  Georges-Henri  Soutou,  “Le  probl￨me  de  l‟￩mergence  de 
l‟Europe  dans  un  monde  multipolaire.  Europe-puissance  ou 
collaboration  transatlantique ?”,  in  Jean  Baechler,  Ramine 
Kamrane, eds., Aspects de la mondialisation politique, Report from 
l‟Acad￩mie des  Sciences morales  et  politiques,  p.  18.  Original 
text: “l‟￩volution des rapports transatlantiques reste absolument 
d￩terminante  pour  l‟avenir  de  l‟Europe  comme  facteur 
international” 
http://www.asmp.fr/travaux/gpw/mondialisation/Baechler1.pd
f  
independent is good for a strong and independent 
alliance”.21  Furthermore,  NATO‟s  60th  birthday 
Summit  in  Strasbourg-Kehl  sought  to  close  the 
cultural gap between the two sides of the Atlantic, 
values  and  interests  are  converging,  and  member 
States  congratulated  Europeans  on  being  more 
efficient in the Declaration on Alliance Security, in 
which  “NATO  recognises  the  importance  of  a 
stronger and more capable European defence, and 
welcomes  the  EU‟s  efforts  to  strengthen  its 
capabilities  and  its  capacity  to  address  common 
security challenges that  both  NATO and the  EU 
face today”.  
We can even add that the new soft-multilateralism 
of Obama hopes to redefine ties with Europe (the 
judicial processing of Guantanamo prisoners being 
just one example). It is quite obvious that the EU 
would  benefit  from  any  comparative  advantages 
that  come  from  the  complementarity  between 
NATO and ESDP regarding territory and function. 
Territorially, NATO may not be allowed to intervene 
in  certain  geographic  areas  because  of  negative 
perceptions  of  the  US.  However,  being  more 
neutral  and  balanced,  the  EU  may  be  seen  as  a 
more legitimate actor in post-Soviet territories or in 
Africa (Georgia or Chad for instance). Functionally, 
the EU is not considered a strategic actor in conflict 
whereas NATO does maintain such mission.  
To  develop  strategic  agility  and  strategic 
expectancy. Agility means flexibility in operations 
(the ability to both plan and react strategically). As 
in Moliere's play where Monsieur Jourdain is able to 
spontaneously create prose on command, the EU 
has  already  expressed  this  agility  through  several 
mission  scenarios.  According  to  the  Chairman  of 
the  Military  Committee,  General  Bentégeat,  three 
kinds of situations are identifiable: type Bosnia (EU 
intervention  after  NATO),  type  Afghanistan  or 
Kosovo (EU intervention as a civil contributor) and 
type Congo (EU autonomous intervention).22 But 
agility  alone  is  not  sufficient.  Hope  must  be 
integrated into strategy because there must be a 
                                                            
21  Authors‟  translation.  “Le  Général  Jones  et  la  PESD”,  Le 
Monde, 24 march 2009, 
http://clesnes.blog.lemonde.fr/2009/03/24/le-general-jones-et-
la-pesd/  
22 Henri Bent￩geat “D￩fense et s￩curit￩ europ￩ennes”, D￩fense 
nationale, February 2009.  
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
6 
#1 
September 2009 
balance between what we hope to win and the risks 
we run. A strategic aim is rational only when hope 
is  positive,  meaning  that  the  expected  gains  are 
superior to the risks any action would encounter. 
Finally, to produce a strategy for the EU, we must 
move beyond European mythology. In the myth of 
Sisyphus,  a  deceitful  actor  copes  with  constant 
handicaps  (failing,  dilemmas,  limitations)  as 
described  by  Stanley  Hoffmann.  In  the  myth  of 
Europa, a woman is seduced by Zeus and carried 
away to Crete where she is protected by the god of 
gods  from  Hera,  and  she  becomes  unwilling  to 
assure her own security. If the EU has “strategic 
qualities”, it suffers from numerous shortcomings 
of strategic institutions and reasoning23 as implied 
by these myths.  
Frédéric  Ramel  is  Professor  of  Political 
Science  at  University  Paris  11,  and 
Scientific  Manager  of  the  Institut  de 
Recherche Stratégique de l’Ecole Militaire 
(IRSEM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
23  Kjell  Engelbrekt  and  Jan  Hallenberg,    “Conclusion  :  A 
Strategic Actor under Permanent Construction? ” , op. cit. 
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